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The Ermine and Woolsack: Disciplinary
Proceedings Involving Judges,
Attorney-Magistrates, and Other Judicial Figures
DAVID CLEVELAND* AND JASON MASIMORE**

The idea that the judicial office is supposed to be invested with ermine, though
fabulous and mythical, is yet most eloquent in significance. We are told that the
little creature called the ermine, is so acutely sensitive as to its own cleanliness,
that it becomes paralyzed and powerless at the slightest touch of defilement
upon its snow-white fur .... And a like sensibility should belong to him who
comes to exercise the august functions of a judge. It is his exalted province to
pronounce upon the rights of life, liberty, and property, to make the law
respected and amiable in the sight of the people; to dignify that department of
the government upon which, more than all others depend the peace, the
happiness, and the security of the people. But when once this great office
becomes corrupted, when its judgments come to reflect the passions or the
interest of the magistrate rather than the mandates of the law, the courts have
ceased to be the conservators of the common weal, and the law itself is
debauched into a prostrate and nerveless mockery.
Harrison v. Wisdom,
54 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99 (1872)
In the Middle Ages, the wool trade was the main source of commercial wealth
in England, and tradition has it that the woolsack was introduced in the House
of Lords to symbolize the importance of wool in the commerce of the realm.
Royal officials attending Parliament were entitled to sit on a woolsack and the
Lord Chancellor, who enjoyed precedence over all peers except a prince royal,
sat on the woolsack nearest the throne. In time, it became customary for the
Lord Chancellor to sit on the woolsack when he delivered judgment in the
Court of Chancery.
C. Ray Miles Const. Co., Inc. v. Weaver,
373 S.E.2d 905, 906 (S.C. App. 1988)
INTRODUCTION

The modem legal system is comprised of a discrete class of professional
lawyers and judges. Lawyers and judges are drawn from the same lot of
individuals, and the ethical obligations of both groups overlap. However, because
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, May 2002 (expected).
** J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, May 2002 (expected).
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our sense of professional ethics is also role-based, lawyers and judges often face
different ethical obligations. While lawyers are viewed as functional elements in
the orderly administration of justice, judges are often equated with justice itself,
1
and they are therefore often held to a higher standard. "A judge increases his
stature by ... the extent to which he squares his conduct with approved moral
and professional standards. The public has a right to expect that of him and if he
does not choose to impose such a standard on himself ·he should not accept
2
judicial appointment. "
This Note begins in Part I by introducing and explaining how a large measure
of our system of legal ethics is determined based on the role of actors within the
system. Parts II and ill present general overviews of the discipline system of
lawyers and judges, respectively. Part IV presents an in-depth examination of
some of the jurisdictional problems encountered when individuals switch roles in
the midst of the legal and ethical system and looks into the various ways courts
can deal with disciplining those who have switched roles. Section A of Part IV
examines disciplinary measures for judicial candidates. Section B examines
jurisdictions that deny jurisdiction to attorney disciplinary bodies over prior acts
of sitting judges. Section C examines arguments made for allowing attorney
disciplinary bodies to oversee attorney-conduct, even if it means jurisdiction over
a sitting judge for pre-bench behavior. Section D concludes Part IV by examining
the disciplining of former judges that they might not escape scrutiny simply by
announcing retirement. Part V lays out the disciplinary measures available to
non-attorneys on the bench or those in judicial-like positions.

I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF ROLE-BASED ETHICS

"To a significant degree, our concept of a code of judicial ethics is shaped by
3
our notion of the role of those it regulates." Similarly, our expectation as to the
4
behavior of lawyers is role-based. The Judicial Code espouses a standard of
conduct in which each judge is charged with preserving the integrity and

1. As suggested in the title, the ennine and woolsack represent this higher standard by identifying the
required purity and the inherent importance of the judiciary. "When a lawyer dons the ennine and mounts the
woolsack he assumes a very serious obligation to the people he serves. Nothing more seriously affects their
lives, their property and their safety than his decisions, the weight of which is detet rnined by his wisdom and
integrity. The ennine is the symbol of purity, honor and wisdom, that brand of wisdom which is the flower of
years and experience. From the time he is clothed with judicial authority he is a marked man. His words and his
conduct should inspire confidence; he might well strive to honor the bench instead of having it honor him. The
judiciary is the capstone of our democracy but it will be S<:> no longer than its deportment warrants." Cone v.
Cone, 68 So.2d 886, 887-88 (Fla. 1953).
2. /d. at 888.
3. Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW AND CONTEM.
PRos. 3, 3 ( 1970).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCf preamble (1983) (hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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5

independence of the judiciary. In regard to lawyers·' obligations, the Model Rules
sets out its own role-based approach; "Law:yers play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by
6
lawyers of their relationship to our legal .s ystem."
The most pertinent difference between the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct is breadth. The role of the lawyer, and
therefore the system of rules that applies, focuses on the lawyer·'s duty within the
7
legal system. That is, a lawyer's conduct is generally regulated only in regard to
that lawyer's specific contact with the legal system. In contrast, the judge~s role
8
includes behavior both as a professional and as a human being. This divergence
in the breadth of the perceived roles of judges and lawyers .has created differing
codes of conduct for each group. The Model Rules emphasize the lawyer's
differing roles within the system by addressing such issues as the funda1nental
10
9
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer as a counselor, the lawyer as an
11
12
advocate, transactions with non-clients, participation in law firms and
14
15
13
associations, public service, allowable rendering of legal services, and
16
maintaining the integrity of the profession. In .comparison, the Judicial Code
emphasizes a judge's personal life (corrunonly called "off-the-·bench behavior").
17
Such concerns include maintaining the integrity of .the profession, avoiding
18
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, proper performance of judicial
19
20
duties, quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities, allowable compensation for
21
22
quasi -judicial and extra-judicial activities, and political activities . As other

5. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCf Canon 1 (1973) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE]. The Reporter's Notes to the
Code of Judicial Conduct explain that Canon 1 expresses the underlying philosophy of the Code. E.W. THoDE,
REPORTER's NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCf 49 ( 1973).
6. MODEL RULES OF PR.oF'L CONDUCT preamble, cmt. 12.
7. As a representative of a client, a lawyer's role may be that of an .advisor, advocate and negotiator. MODEL
RULES preamble, cmt 2. Lawyers also serve as intennediates and evaluators. ld. Finally, a lawyer must

acknowledge his or her status as both a member of the public citizenry and as a member of a learned profession.
/d. at cmt. 5.
8. ''The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of ·disputes and a highly visible symbol of
government under the rule of law." JUDICIAL CoDE preamble, cmt. 1 ( 1990).
9. MODEL RuLES Rule 1.
10. MODEL RULES Rule 2.
11. MoDEL RULES Rule 3.
12. MODEL RULES Rule 4.
13. MODEL RULES Rule 5.
14. MoDEL RuLES Rule 6.
15. MODEL RULES Rule 7.
16. MODEL RULES Rule 8.
17. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1.
18. JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2.
19. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 3.
20. JUDICIAL CODE Canon 4 .
21. JUDICIAL ConE Canon 4.
22. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 5.
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observers of this dichotomy have noted, "[l]t is striking that only Chapter 8 of the
Model Rules deals with the conduct of lawyers outside of their role as lawyers,
while only Canon 3 of the Judicial Code deals solely with a judge's conduct as a
23
judge."
This divergence between what is expected of judges and what is expected of
24
lawyers attests to the different roles these professions play in our legal system.
"[T]he lawyer serves the justice system as a conduit between the laity and the
25
institution." Lawyers operate as tools or parts of the entire self-governing legal
machinery, and are therefore best regulated on this level. In contrast, judges serve
26
both a functional purpose and an abstract purpose. "Judges are the embodiment
of the judicial system and as such their conduct, even extra-judicial conduct, is
27
much more likely to effect the public's perception of the judicial system."
Hence, a system for regulating the behavior of judges must be broader than the
system for lawyers. Thus, while the reputation of lawyers may have some effect
on the public perception of justice, the public's belief in ethical and impartial
28
judges is much more fundamental to a public sense of fair justice and equity.

23. Brian Holland, The Code of Judicial Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A
Comparison of Ethical Codes for Judges and Lawyers, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 725,733 (1989). See also MODEL
RULES Rule 8.2(b ), which simply urges lawyers who are candidates for judicial office to comply with Canon 5 of
the Judicial Code governing candidacies for judicial office.
24. The Preamble to the Judicial Code states, "Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that
judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution
of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law." JUDICIAL Coos preamble~ cmt. 1..
Thus, a judge's charge to remain a highly visible symbol necessitates an emphasis by the Code on the off-bench
life of such a person. In contrast, a lawyer's role is not that of a symbol~ but rather as protector of the
self-governing aspects of the legal profession.
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted
powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close
relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely
in the courts .... To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated .... (A]buse of legal authority is more readily
challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government .... [A] lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers.... [N]eglect of
these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it
serves.
MODEL RULES

preamble, cmt. 9-11.
25. Holland, supra n. 23, at 733.
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
27. MODEL RULE Introduction to Article 10 (Discussion Draft 1980).
28. "Many Americans perceive the courts not only as honorable and fair, but also as important guardians of
property and person in an increasingly large, diverse, and often threatening society. When individual rights clash
with majoritarian values or governmental power, many Americans automatically respond by seeking redress in
the courts." John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts Democratic Values and Judicia/Integrity at
Stake, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 193, 196-97 (1994).

2001]

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

1041

This belief is evident in the respective codes of conduct currently used to regulate
lawyers and judges.

II.

REGULATION OF LAWYERS:

AN OVERVIEW

The regulation of lawyers by the use of ethical standards, as well as other types
29
of regulations, is state-based. Since 1986 however, some uniformity has existed
due to the promulgation of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
30
published by the ABA Joint Committee on Professional Sanctions. These
Standards are a model for disciplinary bodies to look to in imposing sanctions for
31
misconduct. In 1993, the ABA issued the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, which provide an overview of the proper structure for a lawyer
32
regulation system and the proper procedure for disciplinary proceedings. In
most states, the highest court has the responsibility for the discipline of lawyers
licensed in those jurisdictions, and many have closely followed these guide33
lines. The highest court generally delegates the authority to the state bar, a
disciplinary board, or a board of professional responsibility retaining final review
34
power. Most states use a statewide disciplinary system, which provides
35
consistency in the process and substance of sanctions. Most states also follow
the ABA recommendations for judicially controlled attorney disciplinary systems
36
with only minor variations.
Systems for disciplining lawyers generally include an office of disciplinary
counsel, a hearing panel, a statewide review board, and final review by the state's
highest court. Initially, the office of disciplinary counsel evaluates the complaint
to determine whether it is a matter within the jurisdiction of the lawyer discipline
37
system. This office then investigates further if appropriate, and either dismisses
38
the complaint or files fortnal charges against the lawyer in question. If

29. See DEBORAH L. RHoDE AND DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 129 (Foundation Press 1995).
30. See generally ABA JOINT COMMI'ITEE ON PROFESSIONAL SANCI'IONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCI'IONS (1986).
31. /d.
32. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION : BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, MISCONDUCf AND DISCIPLINE,
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf § 101:2003-2007 (Jan. 26, 1994) (recounting the most used
lawyer discipline systems) [hereinafter MISCONDUCf AND DISCIPLINE].
33. /d. at § 101 :2004; see also ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, SURVEY OF LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES IN TilE UNITED STATES (1984) (hereinafter 1984 ABA SURVEY].
34. MiscoNDucr AND DISCIPLINE at§ 101:2004. See also CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL Ennes
§ 3.1, at 79 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS]; 1984 ABA SURVEY (indicating that 1984
Statistics reveal that 36 states had such a structure).
35. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 3.2, at 84.; see also 1984 ABA SURVEY at 1 (finding in 1984 that
46 states had implemented statewide disciplinary agencies).
36. See MISCONDUcr AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 33, at § 101:2004 (stating that in almost all states, the
highest court has the responsibility for the lawyers licensed within that jurisdiction).
37. /d. at§ 101:2004.
38. /d.
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necessary, the panel or committee hears the case and gives a report on the
proceedings. Depending on the available resources, hearing panels perfor1n
39
varying levels of hearings. Then, a statewide disciplinary board reviews the
report of the panel or committee and either recommends sanctions or dismisses
the case. Finally, the case may go before the state's hlghest court, which wields
ultimate decision-making power in lawyer discipline cases. The highest court
may follow the board's disciplinary recommendations or may impose more
40
severe sanctions such as a long-term suspension or disbarment. Although most
41
disciplinary counsel offices do not issue advisory opinions on the ethics rules,
many states now have an ethics committee to assist and advise practitioners
42
through non-binding reports.

III.

JUDICIAL REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW

The regulation of judges is similarly state-based. As the Code of Judicial
Conduct states:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing
high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The
provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that
43
objective.

When this canon is violated, public confidence in the judiciary is diminished,
44
doing injury to our system of government under law. Formerly, to restore
confidence in the judiciary, public measures such as impeachment, recall, and
45
address were used to censure judges. Impeachment occurs when a legislature
46
removes a judge from public office. Recall is a method by which the electorate
47
can vote to remove a judge. Address requires that the legislature ask the
48
governor to remove a judge. These methods proved costly, cumbersome, and
were so rarely used that when they were applied it was often viewed as a personal

39. ld. at§ 101:2004-2005.
40. /d. at§ 101:2004.
41. /d. at§ 101:2005.
42. ld.
43. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1.
44. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 1, cmt.
45. See WILLIAM T. BRAITIIWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JuDGES?: A STUDY OF THE
AND RETIREMENT 12 ( 1971).
46. /d.
47. ld.
48. ld.

PROCEDURES FoR REMovAL
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49

attack on the judge. In response to the inefficiencies inherent in such political
remedies, state governments have developed informal, self-regulating methods
of supervising judges similar to the methods used for lawyers.
To fill the need for judicial supervision, judicial discipline organizations were
created in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal judicial
50
system. Judicial conduct organizations serve a three-fold purpose. First, they
enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct. Second, they attempt to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary. Third, they work to protect judges from frivolous and
51
unwarranted allegations. These organizations review and supervise judicial
behavior and reprimand errant judges, not as punishment, but to protect the
52
public from unfit judges. As the ABA has explained, ''[T]he major purpose of
judicial discipline is not to punish judges, but to protect the public, preserve the
integrity of the judicial process, maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and
create a greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on the part of judges
53
themselves." The Supreme Court of New Jersey has summed up the rationale of
judicial discipline as follows:
The single overriding rationale behind our system of judicial discipline is the
preservation of public confidence in the integrity and the indep,endence of the
judiciary .... This Court cannot allow the integrity of the judicial process to be
compromised in any way by a member of either the Bench or the Bar.
Accordingly, institutional concerns figure prominently in cases involving
judicial discipline . . . . Consonant with those institutional concerns, the
detertnination of sanctions in judicial-discipline cases is not so much to punish
the offending judge as to restore and maintain the dignity and honor of the
54
position and to protect the public from future excesses.

Given this over-arching principle upon which the foundation of judicial
discipline is laid, courts have developed a three-pronged attack launched through
disciplinary measures: announce, deter, and discourage. The discipline imposed
must be designed to announce publicly the system's recognition of misconduct, it
must be sufficient to deter one who is lured toward misconduct from engaging in
such conduct, and it must be an appropriate way to discourage others from

49. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Rev. Bd., 784 F.2d 467,470 (3d Cir. 1986) (examining
Pennsylvania's creation of an independent judicial review board due to the "dissatisfaction with the
cumbersome method of impeachment as the sole procedure for grappling with the problems of the aged, in finn,
irascible, or, in rare instances~ corrupt judges").
50. BRIAN R. PITNEY, Note, Unlocking the Chamber Doors: Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before
the Virginia Judicia/Inquiry and Review Commission, 26 U. RicH. L. REV. 367, 368 (1992) (observing that all
fifty states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia have judicial conduct commissions).
51. /d. at 368.
52. See In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1998); CAL. CONST. Art. 6, § 18(c)(2) (2000).
53. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT, 2 (Tentative Draft,
1977).
54. In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 121 (N.J. 1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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55

engaging in similar conduct in the future. To trus end, public announcement,
deterrence, and discouragement in effect triangulate the position of disciplinary
procedures and sanctions properly aimed at the unique role of a judge.
The standard for judicial behavior is clearly and intentionally higher than the
6
standard for attorney behavior. 5 "Judges should be held to even stricter ethical
standards [than lawyers] because in the nature of things even more rectitude and
57
uprightness is expected of them." The expectation is reflected in society's
58
tendency to equate fair, impartial judges with justice. Many state courts have
stated clearly that they intend to hold judges to a high standard, on and off the
bench. For example, Ohio courts explained, "[i]mproper conduct which may be
overlooked when committed by the ordinary person, or even a lawyer, cannot be
59
overlooked when committed by a judge." Many jurisdictions have scrutinized
the imposition this heightened burden of ethical behavior places on judges, and
have nevertheless held that any restriction on the judge is outweighed by the need
60
for an ethical judiciary. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained
its belief that although "a judge is entitled to lead his own private life free from
unwarranted intrusion," because he is subject to constant public scrutiny, "he
must adhere to standards of probity and propriety higher than those deemed
61
acceptable for others." The court discounted any sense of unfairness regarding
this high burden, stating, "More is expected of him and, since he is a judge,
62
rightfully so. A judge should weigh this before he accepts his office." Some
jurisdictions, even when strongly supporting the need for an ethical judiciary,
have strongly cautioned that assuming the mantle of the judiciary subjects one to
63
great scrutiny of both p~blic and private behavior. Thus, "[f]rom the time he is
clothed with judicial authority he is a marked man .... The judiciary is the
capstone of our democracy but it will be so no longer than its deportment

55. State ex rei. Comm. on Judicial Qualifications v. Empson, 562 N. W.2d 817, 832 (Neb. 1997) (''Thus, we
discipline a judge not for purposes of vengeance or retribution, but to instruct the public and all judges,
ourselves included, of the importance of the function perfonned by judges in a free society.") (citations and
internal quotations omitted); see also In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 532-33 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998) (stating "[T]he
ultimate standard for judicial conduct ... must be conduct which constantly reaffinns one's fitness for the high
responsibilities of judicial office and which continuously maintains, if not furthers, the belief that an
independent judiciary exists to protect the citizen from both government overreaching and individual
self-help.").
56. "A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept
restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly." JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2(A), cmt. 1.
57. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 1977).
58. See Sahl, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 291 N.E.2d 477,482 (Ohio 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
60. See In re Pagliughi, 189 A.2d 218, 221 (N.J. 1963) ("Once a lawyer becomes a judge, his activities are
restricted in great part.").
61. In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203, 235 (Mass. 1973).
62. /d.
63. See Cone v. Cone, 68 So.2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1953).
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warrants ... ~ The judiciary is in fact no place for the exhibitionist, one who has
64
not matured emotionally or one who cannot restrain his passions." This higher
expectation of judges can be a source of concern when organizations created to
discipline judges seek to investigate the conduct of law.y ers seeking a judgeship,
when as lawyers, they are used to a less invasive swath of regulations.

IV.

ROLE-BASED ETHICS WHEN SWITCHING ROLES

When lawyers commit professional misconduct and then later are appointed or
elected to the bench, an issue arises over who may discipline them. This simple
question is a morass of legal and ethical dilemmas. On the one hand, the bad actor
was a lawyer when the misconduct took place and should therefore be subject to
censure by the lawyer discipline system. However, this gives a panel designed for
dealing with lawyer misconduct jurisdiction over sitting judges. Alternatively,
because the person is currently a sitting judge, he should be subject to the
reprimand of the appropriate judicial commission. However, it is questionable
whether a judicial commission should invade the province of the attorney in
punishing the acts of lawyers.
The key problems presented are two-fold. First, a jurisdictional dilemma
occurs unless the state constitution or a state statute is written to clarify who may
65
discipline whom. Most states provide that judges can only be censured by the
proscribed judicial commission under the authority of the state's highest court or
by one of the older methods of discipline (impeachment, recall, or address) if
66
they are left in place. This would seem to place judges beyond the pale of
67
lawyer discipline for their acts as lawyers. This basic issue is one that can lead
68
to dismissal of otherwise genuine cases of misconduct.
A second problem presented when a disciplinary body reaches out to punish
behavior not typically within its jurisdiction is a choice oflaw~type problem~ This
occurs because the lawyer disciplinary system is not set up to punish violations of
the Judicial Code,-and the judicial commission is not set up to punish violations
69
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Many jurisdictions have not yet
provided any means by which disciplinary bodies can resolve this conundrum. In

64. Jd.
65. See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Neb. 2000) (examining as a
threshold matter what body has jurisdiction).
66~ .Jd.; see also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
67. In re Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr., 6 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Mo. l999).
68. See Blackwell v. Bayles; 366 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. App. 1984) (stating "(t]he coun rules indicate that the
Supreme Court and the Judicial Tenure Commission have the exclusive jurisdiction to consider this type of
case •... The preliminary injunctions·and temporary restraining order are, therefore, dissolved.").
69. Courts are more than willing to note this distinction. See, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 596 P~2d
864 (Okla. 1979) (approving of Trial .Authority's refusal to accept Bar Association's position that attorney
misconduct of a then-seated judge was conclusively established by an earlier proceeding finding the judge
guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct}.
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some jurisdictions, however, the grant of authority to judicial disciplinary bodies
includes an express grant to discipline judges for actions that occurred prior to
70
taking the bench. Generally, this extension of jurisdiction applies in one of two
ways. First, the judicial colll111ission may be empowered to discipline judges for
71
their actions in campaigning for the judicial position. Second, the judicial
commission may be empowered to discipline for conduct that constitutes
misconduct in office, conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of
72
justice, or another ground of discipline listed in the state constitution.
In the absence of an extension of jurisdiction and some direction as to the
extension of the substantive aspects of the disciplinary system, states are left with
a gap in their overall scheme of discipline within the legal system. This gap
created by these dual disciplinary systems primarily occurs when lawyers
commit so-m e questionable act just prior to taking the judgeship. State courts
asked to resolve this issue in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory rules
73
have, in recent decisions, come out on both sides of this debate. States like
Nebraska have decided that sitting judges are beyond the reach of lawyer
74
disciplinary proceedings. Other states, such as Missouri, have decided that
conduct prior to a judge's taking the bench falls outside the jurisdiction of the
judicial committee and that such misconduct should be punished by the lawyer
75
disciplinary system.

A. THE JUDICIAL CANDIDATE
A person becomes a candidate for judicial office the moment she makes a
public announcement of the candidacy, files as a candidate with the election or
appointment (luthority, authorizes others to gamer support, or accepts support or
76
contributions. Methods of choosing judges vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-

70. See infra notes 72-73.
71. See In rc Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Jud. Disc. 2000) (stating that a judge who seeks re-election can
be disciplined by the judicial discipline system regardless of his success in the election, but an attorney
candidate would be disciplined in the attorney system if he lost and in the judicial system if he won the
election.).
72. See MICfflGAN COURT RULE 9.205. See also In te Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (upholding the
removal of a judge for acts of professional misconduct that occurred while he was acting as an attorney); In re
Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Mich. 1975) ("[m]isconduct~ although unrelated to the perfonnance of judicial
duties, and even if occurring before the lawyer becomes a judge, may be 'conduct that is clearly prejudicial to
the administration of justice' "); In re Greenberg, 280 A~2d 370 (Pa. 1971) (mail fraud was grounds for removal
from the b~nch even though the fraudulent acts were committed before becoming a judge); In re Sarisohn, 233
N.E.2d 276,281 (N.Y. 1967) (judicial discipline is warranted by misconduct occurring before becoming a judge
that would justify debarment from future office or which relates to general character and fitness for office).
73. Compare State ex rei. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1 (Neb., 2000) with In re
Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr., 6 S. W.3d 869 (Mo. 1999).
74. See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2000).
75. See In re Honorable Don E. Burrell, Jr, 6 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. 1999).
76. See JUDICIAL CODE Terminology (defining '~candidate").
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tion, sometimes varying within one jurisdiction~ and can consist of appointment
by executive or legislative branches, appointment based on merit selection,
77
nonpartisan election, and partisan election. A public campaign for a judicial
position impacts the light in which the public views judicial officers in three
ways. First, after a candidate is elected based on promises to the electoral body,
she may feel the obligation to make good on those promises once seated on the
78
bench. A mirror image of that concern is the potential for vindicating certain
attacks on a judge's record or tendencies launched by an unsuccessful oppo·
79
nent. Second, a judge who wishes to run for re-election at the end of her term
may be driven to arrive at decisions that will look favorably in future campaign
ads, or at the very least avoid decisions that would provide a prospective
8
challenger with ammunition. ° Finally, and most importantly in light of the role
of a judiciary, the public may come to perceive that the judges will act in
furtherance of their campaigns, rather than in regard to proper legal processes
81
In light of the importance of
that hold litigant's rights as paramount.
maintaining the integrity of the judiciary even as cut-throat competition ensues to
obtain such a distinguished position, both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Model Rules demand that a candidate conduct herself with the utmost respect for
82
th·e office.
A successful candidate who has been transfortned from a lawyer or even a
layperson into a judicial officer is held responsible under Judicial Codes of
83
Conduct for her successful campaign. In In reJudge Roy Cascio, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, acting upon the reconunendation of the Judiciary Commission of
Louisiana, censured a successful judicial candidate for falsely claiming in his

77. See JUDICIAL CODE Canon 5, n.5.
78. See In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (citing In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997)}.
79. See id.
80. See id. (citing Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993)).
81. /d. (citing Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. ·O f the Supreme Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 147, 144 (3d Cir~ 1991)).
82. JUDICIAL CoDE Canon 5 outlines a series of complicated hurdles designed to ensure a candidacy that does
not result in the appointment or election of a judicial officer with favors to return and does not impugn that
officer's tenure. MODEL RULE 8.2(b) refers the attorney who is also a judicial candidate to the JUDICIAL CODE for
guidance.
83. In fact, some jurisdictions go so far as to require a judicial candidate to undergo mandatory training in
proper judicial campaign conduct. Ohio State Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(5) states, "No earlier than
one year prior to and no later than thirty days after certification of his or her candidacy by the election authority,
a judicial candidate shall complete a two-hour course in campaign practices, finance, and ethics accredited by
the Commission on Continuing Legal Education. Within five days of completing the course, the judicial
candidate shall certify to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline his or her completion of the
course and understanding of the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct and applicable provisions of the
Revised Code." OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. Jud. Canon 7(B)(5) (Anderson 2000). The court in In re Judicial
Complaint of Hein, 706 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio 1999), held a prosecuting attorney liable for his improper judicial
campaign statements about his opponent despite his lack of knowledge defense based on the requirement of
familiarity with campaign rules imposed by Canon 7(8)(5).
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campaign literature that he was an incumbent. Of course, a genuine incumbent
candidate for judicial office:, by definition, would already be subject to the full
force of codes of judicial conduct in which the candidacy rules lie~ However, as
the court in In re Tennant points out, the rules regarding a judicial candidacy
apply to all candidates, whether they are incumbent judges or lawyers seeking
85
their first judicial office. Although the Judicial Investigation Commission's
complaint erroneously asserted that Tennant was currently s_erving as a magistrate
ju-d ge durin_g his campaign, and therefore subject to the judicial codes, the court
86
noted that Canon 5
Hgenerally applies to all incumbent judges and judicial
candidates. A candidate, whether or not an incumbent, and whether or not
87
successful, is subject to judicial discipline for his or her campaign conduct.''
Even a person not already subject to a judicial code whose candidacy fails to
result in her election stands under that umbrella of the judicial code upon
88
becoming a candidate.- Regardless of the roles of a lawyer or a judge, the nature
of the judiciary is such that both must be controlled under a judicial code to
maintain its proper functioning and all-important credibility in the public eye.
Once the judge is seated, the dilemma focuses on which disciplinary body shall
be responsible for examining_grievances and recommending sanctions.
B. PRIOR ACTS OF SITTING JUDGES PUNISHABLE
ONLY BY JUDICIAL BODY

The issue presented in these cases caught in the gap between judicial and
lawyer disciplinary bodies is whether the ABA-created lawyer disciplinary body
may institute or prosecute charges against a sitting member of the judiciary for
poor conduct as a lawyer. Recently, the Supreme Court of Nebraska spoke on this
very issue, holding that the lawyer disciplinary body could not initiate proceed-

84. In re Cascio, 683 So. 2d 1202 (La. 1996). Ironically, when previously serving as an ad hoc judge on a few
occasions, Judge Cascio was required and did sign a statement that said, in part, ''I will not use the title of judge
or use any photograph in a judicial robe in any campaig,n for elective office, or use any other advertising that
may mislead the public_into believing that I am or have been elected to a judicial office." ld. at 1202-03.
85. In re Tennant, 516 S.E.2d 496 (W.Va. 1999) (holding that judicial candidate;s personal solicitation of
campaign contributions warranted admonishment, even though candidate was not an incumbent judge).
86. /d. Canon 5 of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct is analogous to Canon 5 of lhe ABA Code of
Jtidicia/ Conduct controlling campaigns.
87. /d. at 498 n.2 (emphasis added).
88. Case after case holds unsuccessful candidates who have never been judges accountable undetjudicial
codes for improper campaign tactics. See, e.g., In re Bybee, supra note 78. Eliciting the vote of the same-persons
over which a potential judge would preside presents such a potential for mischief that it is fundamental to the
interests of the judicial branch to guard against such conduct by all means necessary. See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text. Even MODEL RULE 8.2(b) recognizes the importance of attorneys obeying the ethical
guidelines of judicial campaigns despite the differing roles of the professions. In fact, the same concerns of
potential future litigants under a presiding judge bear on the success or failure of individual attorneys who may
either reap the benefits of political capital sown with successful candidates or face the wrath of the successful
opponent not supported by an attorney appearing before him or her on behalf of a litigant.
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ings against a sitting judge. This denial of jurisdiction of the ABA over prior
acts of a lawyer when investigated during that lawyer's tenure as a sitting judge
rests on two arguments_: 1) structural and public policy reasons favor disallowing
lawyers to have jurisdiction over those under whom they serve:; and 2) the
judicial disciplinary committee is adequately equipped to deal properly with past
acts of a lawyer if it is granted the right to examine pre-bench acts which might
harm the judiciary.
1.

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODIES AND SilTING JUDGES

Structural arguments as well as public policy militate against allowing lawyer
disciplinary bodies to discipline judges. States like Nebraska reason that their
90
state constitutions and statutes treat judges and lawyers differently. This
opinion is supported by the very role-based nature of the two different
disciplinary systems, as seen in the varied levels of attention in the two codes
91
directed toward ethical behavior outside the official duties of the roles.
Oklahoma reached a similar result in principle in finding that the Oklahoma Bar
92
Association could not discipline a - sitting judge. In Chambers, the bar
association claimed that it had authority to proceed against any Oklahoma judge
if it deemed that such judge was guilty of mis_conduct on the bench. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that a sitting judge is technically
precluded from practicing law, and is therefore outside the bar association's
93
purview for as long as she holds a judicial position. Because all rights and
privileges to engage in the practice of law are suspended upon being seated at the
bench, role-based lawyer disciplinary procedures, designed to ensure that such
rights and privileges are not extended to those unfit to practice law, are not
94
appropriate to discipline judges. Hearkening back to a more traditional
approach to judicial discipline, Florida endorsed an argument that couples
structural reasons with a_ constitutional basis to deny the ABA's claim of
jurisdiction over pre-bench acts as a lawyer, finding that the ABA's assertion of
jurisdiction had "no legitimate objective other than the ultimate removal of
petitioner from office, a result intended under our Constitution to be accom95
plished only by impeachment." A clear concern created by the possibility of
judges being disciplined by a lawyer disciplinary body is that lawyers might hold

89.

Krepela~

610 N.W.2d 1.

90. Id.
91. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
92. See Chambers v. Central Committee of Oklahoma Bar Ass,n, 224 P.2d 583 (1950)~
93. /d.
94. See In reProposed Disciplinary Action, 103 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1958).
95. ld. at 633. However, the addition of another method of discipJine, such as through a judicial disciplinary
body, presumably would not alter the analysis because that too would provide for removal of a sitting judge by
means other than specified in a state's constitution.
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power over judges in a manner not intended by the superintending powers of
states' legislatures and highest courts and result in the removal of judges in a
96
manner not contemplated by the states' constitutions. In an Alabama case, the
Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that the forum for actions against lawyers was
completely separate from that provided by the state constitution for ousting
97
judges, and therefore neither forum could invade the province of the other.
In addition to the major structural reasons for denying the ABA jurisdiction
over sitting judges, there exists a major public policy reason concerning the
independence of our judicial system. If lawyer disciplinary bodies were permitted
to discipline members of the judiciary, the independence of the judiciary would
be abrogated, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained:
The judges of all our courts must have independence . . . . While that
independence does not give them the right to indulge in the [unfit]
conduct ... it surely must give them freedom from supervision by the
practicing attorneys in their courts and freedom from any requirement that they
answer and stand trial before the attorneys, and before the Bar Association ,. ...
The opposite rule and practice contend for, as we have heretofore pointed out,
could not accomplish any good, but would result in nothing more than discord,
and could result in confusion, pernicious partisan political activity concerning
the judiciary, and other results not beneficial to the administration of justice, or
98
desirable in connection with the service to be rendered by the bench and bar.

Alabama's highest court echoed this sentiment, concluding that allowing the bar
to discipline judges would expose judges to an inappropriate review by attorneys
because:
[it] would be an act removing a constitutional armor, we think properly placed,
around a judge so that he may remain free to function without fear or favor, and
without subjecting his actions to discipline by lawyers who may be practicing
before him, through the office of the State Bar Association, regardless of how
99
honorable the motives of the would-be prosecutors may be.

In many jurisdictions, therefore, the lawyer disciplinary body may not
discipline a sitting judge, even for acts of a non-judicial nature which took place
prior to the individual's taking the bench. When a member of the judiciary
assumes the bench, she is prohibited from practicing law, and this suspension of
the practice also suspends the applications of the lawyer disciplinary system to

96. See Krepela, 610 N.W.2d at 402. See also In re Jones, 12 So. 2d 795 (La. 1943) (stating that to allow
disbarment of judg~ solely on the basis of loss of right to practice, would allow for the removal -o f judges by the
bar which could revoke a judge's license and thereby do indirectly that which cannot be done directly).
97. See Alabama State Bar ex rei. Steiner v. Moore, 213 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1968).
98. Chambers, 224 P.2d at 586.
99. Moore, 213 So. 2d at408.
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the judge.
Additionally, states, in creating these systems, sought to avoid
subjecting judges to review by lawyers or otherwise breaching the independence
of the judiciary.
2. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY BODIES CAN PuNISH FOR ACTS COMMI'ri'EO
PRioR TO TAKING THE BENCH

Unless jurisdiction was vested in the judicial disciplinary body, denying
lawyer disciplinary bodies jurisdiction over prior acts of a sitting judge would
leave acts committed by lawyers prior to taking the bench essentially unregulable. In order to provide the necessary mechanism by which to avoid the
embarrassment of allowing unethical pre-bench behavior to go unscrutinized and
therefore implicitly endorsed, states often rely on constitutional provisions and
10
other language to support the jurisdictjon of judicial discipline committees. J
Nebraska's constitution provides that a judge may be disciplined for any conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute, including actions of the judge that occurred prior to the time the judge
102
took office. The court in Krepela defended its finding of exclusive jurisdiction
of the judicial disciplinary body as consistent with the overall system of
discipline for judges and lawyers, explaining that the ABA had itself recommended that a commission on judicial conduct be created with jurisdiction over
03
allegations of misconduct that had occurred before service as a judge} The
Supreme Court of Florida also has consistently ruled that pre-judicial conduct
may be used as a basis for removal or reprimand of a judge by the judicial
disciplinary body, because the state constitution includes a similar grant of
authority to investigate pre-judicial
acts_
and
recommend
to
the
state's
high
court
the removal (for unfitness) or reprimand (for misconduct) of a sitting judge:
"[t]he language of section 12 [Fla. Const. Art. V, § 12(a)] is unambiguous on its
face and we conclude that it means just what it says: The_Connnission may
investigate and recorrunend the removal or reprimand of any judge. whose
104
·c onduct in or outside of office warrants such action."
Even absent explicit constitutional grants of jurisdiction as found in the
.

.

.

.

.

I00. See JUDICIAL CODE Canon 4(G).
10 l. In Krepela, the ·N ebraska Supreme Court held that the judicial disciplinary body could properly punish a
judge for thejudge's acts prior to taking the bench, finding support in the state constitution, which provides the
judicial disciplinary body with the authority to consider the acts of ajudge that occurred prior to the judge's
assuming the bench. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d at 5-6.
102. /d. at 8.
103. Krepela, ·6 10 N.W.2d at 5. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT§ I, Rule 2B(l) (1994).
I 04. See In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 403 (Fla~ 1994) (The court cites a number of cases for this
proposition.) See also In re Meyerson~ 581 So. 2d 581 {Fla. 1991); In reCapua, 561 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990); In re
Camesoltas, 563 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1990); In re Berkowitz, 522 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1988); In re Sturgis, 529 So. 2d
281 (Fla. 1988); In re Byrd; 511 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1987); In re Speiser, 445 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1984).
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Nebraska and Florida constitutions, most states have at least some language
which would allow the judicial commission broad discretion to examine past
behavior that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or brings the judicial
office into disrepute. For example, in a triad of cases decided throughout the
1970s, Michigan found and affirmed the jurisdiction of judicial disciplinary
bodies over ''conduct as a practicing lawyer unrelated to judicial duties, [because]
such non-judicial conduct might be 'conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the
105
Those jurisdictions not granting authority over
administration of justice.' "
judges to lawyer disciplinary bodies are quick to find basis for authority of the
judicial bodies to self-regulate.
C. PRIOR ACTS OF SITriNG JUDGES PUNISHABLE
ONLY BY LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODY

Cases presenting this jurisdictional dilemma as to which disciplinary body has
the authority to investigate judges for their conduct as lawyers have not
uniformly been decided in favor of the judicial disciplinary body. On the issue of
who has the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings against a judge, some
states such as Missouri have decided that the lawyer disciplinary bodies are
appropriate for punishing behavior committed as a lawyer regardless of that
106
lawyer's present status as a judge.
The support for this choice rests on two
arguments. First, the explicit jurisdictional grant of the judicial disciplinary body
simply does not extend to acts committed by someone who is not a judge at the
time he or she engages in the behavior. Second, any unethical acts by a lawyer are
appropriately and adequately within the scope of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and punishable by the lawyer disciplinary system regardless of the
perpetrator's occupational status when disciplinary actions are finally initiated.
1.

STRUCfURAL DENIAL OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY BODIES' JURISDICTION

The primary argument for keeping the right to scrutinize and administer
sanctions for a lawyer's actions with the lawyer disciplinary bodies, even if the
forrner lawyer is a judge at the time discipline is contemplated, is structural. The
very use of a dual system of discipline, geared towards different role-based goals,
which subject individuals to different duties depending on their function within
the entire judicial scheme, supports this narrow reading. It may be inappropriate
for judicial 'b odies to discipline lawyers with their use of expansive inquiries and
expectations of off-bench behavior because lawyers serve a much different role

105. In re Kapcia, 205 N.W.2d 436,440 (Mich. 1973) (citing MICHIGAN COURT RULE 9.205(E)). See also In
re Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1975); State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Moes, 205 N.W.2d 428 (Mich.
1973).
106. See In Re Burrell, 6 S.W.3d at 870 (holding that the judicial disciplinary body could not reach attorney
misbehavior merely because the attorney had become a judge).
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within the entire judicial system.
Many courts that deny judicial commissions any authority over previous acts
of lawyers rely on strict readings of their state constitutions. For example, the
Missouri constitution states in part that "[t]he Uudicial] commission shall receive
and investigate all requests and suggestions for retirement for disability, and all
complaints concernin-g misconduct of all judges, members of the judicial
108
commissions, and of this commission." Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court
read this subsection to grant the judicial commission authority over the
misconduct of sitting judges only, therefore denying the Commission any
109
authority over misconduct by lawyers before they become judges.
Moreover,
the court viewed nothing in the constitution to give judicial disciplinary bodies
any sort of pendent jurisdiction over the misconduct of lawyers merely because
they become judges, but instead found that the judge's alleged misconduct was
outside the reach of the judicial disciplinary body because it occurred while she
still was a lawyer. Such fonnalistic analysis without regard to the previously
enumerated countervailing concerns also results in finding lawyer disciplinary
bodies adequate to discipline judges.
2.

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BODIES CAN PuNISH FOR ACTS COMMI'I,'ED
PRIOR TO TAKING THE BENCH

Denying the judicial disciplinary bodies jurisdiction would leave acts committed by lawyers prior to taking the bench unregulated and essentially unregulable,
unless jurisdiction was found for the lawyer disciplinary body. In In re Burrell,
the Missouri Supreme Court found that while the judicial body could not take
action, the lawyer disciplinary body could properly punish a judge for thejudge's
110
acts prior to taking the bench. The court believed that the lawyer disciplinary
body could adequately deal with the concerns of the judicial disciplinary body
about investigation of a judge for his acts in campaigning for the position of judge
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(b) which states, "A lawyer who is
a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the
111
Code of Judicial Conduct." Of course, given the fact that the ABA itself has
recommended the forrnation of a judicial committee to address pre-bench lawyer
behavior, this rule does not necessarily indicate the intention that it be enforced
112
by the lawyer disciplinary bodies.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See supra notes 3-29 and accompanying text.
Mo. CONST. ART V, § 24, §§ ].
See In re Burrell, 6 S.W.3d at 870.
See id.
See id. (quoting the MoDEL RULES Rule 4-8.2(b)).
See supra note 101.
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D. DISCIPLINING FORMER JUDGES

A system that limits the authority of judicial commissions to addressing only
those pre-bench acts carried out during a judicial campaign and those acts
committed and prosecuted while the judge is sitting, but at the same time denying
jurisdiction of a lawyer discipline mechanism because a sitting judge is
technically no longer a lawyer, would leave a gaping hole of uncorrectable
misconduct. A judge could simply retire, or, if the conduct was complained of too
close to end of a term to allow a full disciplinary procedure, promise not to seek
another ter1n to avoid sanctions. Under a regime such as this, a judge would have
little incentive to watch her step because the threat of removal from the bench, or
the stripping away of future livelihood in practicing law again after retiring
would be empty. In this regard, courts have indicated that a judge may not retire
and be absolved of his wrongdoings by virtue of her voluntary forfeiture of the
position.
In In re Thayer, a former judge sought to end proceedings against him for
113
allegations of judicial misconduct while on the bench. Thayer argued that upon
his resignation, the conunittee lost jurisdiction over his conduct as a judge and
114
any such case would pass to the Committee on Professional Conduct.
The
court, however, analyzed the jurisdictional dilemma in tertns of the purpose of
judicial discipline and the role of judges. Since the entire purpose of judicial
discipline proceedings is to protect the public, preserve the integrity of the
process, maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and create awareness of
proper judicial behavior on the part of judges, that purpose is not only served by
the removal or suspension of a sitting judge but also by the ability of the judicial
commission to hold a public hearing and to levy sanctions other than removal,
115
such as censure. "Even after leaving office, an ex-judge retains the status of the
judicial office on his resume. The public is entitled to know if the record is
116
tamished."
Further, applying for removal cannot replace judicial removal
proceedings because there is a different concern that is implicated in judicial
disciplinary actions that is not addressed by other proceedings arising from the
117
judge's on-bench conduct. Though there may be a split of authority on whether
a judicial disciplinary body has jurisdiction over a judge who resigns, most hold
118
that jurisdiction continues.

113. In re Thayer, 761 A.2d 1052 (N.H. 2000).
114. Jd. at 1058-59.
115. ld. at 1055.
116. /d. at 1060.
117. /d. at 1059 (quoting Matter of Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 31 (N.J. 1985)).
118. Jd. at 1059. Indeed, most jurisdictions which hold contrary rest on other principles outlined by their
individual specific laws. See id. at 1060. See also In re Fuyat, 578 A.2d 1387 (R.I. 1990). "The principles
recognized in these cases have rested upon absence of jurisdiction and the doctrine of mootness." /d. at 1388.
The California courts have also recently addressed the issue. See Rosasco v. Comm. on Judicial Perfonnance, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d Ill (Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that an amendment specifically granting jurisdictional authority
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The Florida courts have likened a claim by a retired judge that the bar has no
jurisdiction to discipline her for misconduct while she was a judicial officer to a
claim ''that a lawyer is immune from discipline for the most egregious ethical
improprieties, so long as his misconduct disgraced not only the bar but the bench
1 19
as well." The court reasoned that because actions as a judge bear on a lawyer's
120
fitness to practice law at all, there can be a basis for discipline as a lawyer.
However, an Oklahoma case raises an interesting concern:
The public policy which renders a judge acting in a judicial capacity in a court
proceeding immune from civil liability for damages must apply with equal
force to a disciplinary proceeding [by a bar association] if the judiciary is to
maintain its independence. In our opinion, an attorney may not be disciplined
for acts committed by him in his official capacity as a judge unless such acts
involve moral turpitude, of a fraudulent, criminal or dishonest character ....
Lack of legal knowledge, unsound judgment, bias and prejudice, oppression or
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion on the part of a judge in his official acts
121
constitute no grounds for disciplinary action against him as an attomey.

This "independence of the judiciary"' rationale, however, is easily rebutted.
First, it does not address several primary concerns of judicial discipline: to
protect the public; preserve the integrity of the process; maintain public
confidence in the judiciary; and create awareness of proper judicial behavior on
122
the part of judges.
Second, although it is important for a judicial officer to
make decisions without worrying about liability:
To hold judges exempt from professional misconduct proceedings would
deprive members of the public of any remedy. Moreover, to hold that judges
may not be sanctioned for actions which exceed their lawful authority would
totally disregard the protection of the public, the administration of justice, the
maintenance of professional standards, and the deterrence of similar conduct.
We discipline a judge to reassure the citizens ... that the judiciary of their state
.

.

over on-the-bench actions of judges after retirement passed in 1995, but was held to not act in retroactive
fashion, and thus, a judge who retired in 1993 could not be investigated for his pre-judge conduct or his bench
conduct)~

119. Florida Bar v. McCain, 330 So. 2d 712, 714 (1976). Acknowledging the distinction fomented by the
role-based approach to discipline, the Florida Supreme Court relied on an early Wisconsin case, In re Stolen,
214, N. W. 379 (1927). In In re Stolen, the attorney complained that misconduct in character as a judge had no
bearing to the responsibilities and duties as a member of the bar; however, the court reasoned that one's lack of
morality can be exhibited in many ways, so that if a judge shows the lack of moral qualifications required by all
attorneys, it is the duty of the court to prune him out of the profession and not allow him to cloak himself in his
office to avoid scrutiny by the bar. See 214 N.W. 379 (1927).
120. McCain, 330 So.2d at 715.
121 . State ex rei. Oklahoma B'ar Ass' n v. Sullivan, 596 P., 2d 864, 869 ( 1979).
122. See Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929', 947 (Miss. 1997).
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is dedicated to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of
men.t23

In light of the ov,e rwhelming public interest in holding judges accountable to
every extent possible, it seems only reasonable that they should be subject to
scrutiny both in the broader sens.e of that afforded by judicial commissions and in
the narrower sense which focuses on their duties as lawyers.

111.

NON-LAWYERS AS JUDGES AND MISCELLANEOUS JUDICIAL POSITIONS

It is no excuse that one acting as a judge is not or has never been a lawyer. The
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides in its definition of "judge"
that "[a]nyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and
who perfortns judicial functions ... is a judge within the meaning of this
124
Code"" In this regard, the Ohio State Code of Judicial Conduct requires that:
No earlier than one year prior to and no later than thirty days after ·certification
of his or her candidacy by the election authority, a judicial candidate shall
complete a two-hour course in campaign practices, finance, and ethics
accredited by the Commission on Continuing Legal Education. Within five
days of completing the course·, the judicial candidate shall certify to the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline his or her completion of the
course and understanding of the requirements of the Code of,Judicial Conduct
125
and applicable provisions of the Revised Code.

This requirement acknowledges that a person has a duty to familiarize herself
with the appropriate rules of conduct befitting a judge, regardless of whether or
not she is a lawyer. As Judge Jasen points out in his dissenting opinion in In re
Dixon:
[I]t would be most inappropriate to establish a two-tiered level of professional
conduct for Judges: that of the lawyer and the non-lawyer. Upon taking the oath
of office, a Judge, whatever his background, has an affirmative obligation to
make himself aware of the bounds of proper judicial conduct. A judge should
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
126
judiciary may be preserved.

This two-tiered system could not be based on the public interests served by
judicial discipline a litigant cares about integrity of the judicial process first

123. /d. at 948 (equating judicial proceedings with bar proceedings in that they both aim to protect the
public) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
124. JUDICIAL CoDE Application A (emphasis added).
125. See OHIO STATE CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(b)(5), supra note 83 and accompanying text.
126. In re Dixon 393 N.E.2d 523, 527 (N.Y. 1979) (Jasen, J. dissenting) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
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and foremost, not what profession the judge had before deciding the litigant's
case.
The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct contains specific provisions regarding
127
The definition of judge is
those individuals not serving as full-time judges.
tailored to encompass all roles in which an individual performs judicial
129
128
130
functions. The retired judge subject to recall, continuing part-time judge,
132
131
periodic part-time judge·, and pro tempore part-time judge all are subject to
the Code. In Thomas the court held that a mayor who sometimes acted as a pro
tempore judge fell under the definition of "judge" and subsequently held him
133
accountable to the judicial commission.
The mayor contended that the
134
commission had absolutely no authority against _p ersons outside the judiciary.
However, applying the analogous state code of conduct, he was deemed a ''judge"
because he had served as a judge, and the coutt agreed that the commission had
135
Furthermore, the court reaffirmed interest in maintaining strict
jurisdiction.
control over even the lowest of courts, stating:
There are good reasons why our justice court judges must regard scrupulously
the nature of their office. In the first place, most of our citizens have their
primary, if not their only, direct contact with the law through the office of the
justice court judge. The perception of justice of most of our citizens is forged
out of their experiences with our justice court judges. If these judges do not
behave with judicial temperament and perform their duties according to the law
and by reference to the process of adjudication, there seems little hope that our
136
citizenry at large may understand and respect the legal process.
CONCLUSION

A role-based view of judicial and lawyer discipline is the key to maintaining a
healthy system, especially considering that "[m]any Americans perceive the
courts not only as honorable and fair, but also as important guardians of property
137
and person in an increasingly large, diverse, and often threatening society."

127. JUDICIAL CODE Application C-E.
128. Specifically the definition states: "Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial
system and who performs judicial functions, including an officer such as a magistrate, court commissioner,
special master or referee, is a judge within the meaning of this Code." /d. Application A. As the commentary
notes, "The four categories of judicial service in other than full-time capacity are necessarily defined in general
tenns because of the widely varying forrns of judicial service." /d. Application A, cmt.
129. /d. Application B.
130. /d. Application C.
131. /d. Application D.
•
132. /d. Application E.
133. Mississippi Judicial Perfonnance Commission v. Thomas, 549 So. 2d 962 (Miss. 1989).
134. Id. at 964.
135. /d.
136. /d. at 965-6 (internal citations omitted).
137. Sahl, supra note 28 at 196-97 and accompanying text.
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Discipline must not be seen as a way of punishing those who have sullied their
offices and the system, for that leads to tough jurisdictional questions and puts an
accused's judicial peers in the untoward position of passing personal judgment.
Rather, the better view looks at the roles of the persons, either as judges or as
lawyers, and considers what is best to maintain the public's faith in the system
that is oftentimes the dividing line between peace and widespread individual
self~help. To this end, regardless of which disciplinary body acts, the trinity of
public announcement of misconduct, measures to deter one from repeating an
offense and punishment that discourages others from following suit, are
all-important in effecting this role-based protection of all aspects of our American
judicial system so erminesque in its fragility..
.

